Battlefield Update and Russia’s Setbacks
Reflections on Russia and Ukraine: May 18, 2024
Over the last number of weeks, the battlefield in the Russian-Ukrainian war has shifted to the area surrounding Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city. Kharkiv has a population of approximately 1.5 million and is located close to Ukraine’s northeastern border with Russia. This region once was a center for pro-Russian separatists, but now its population has decided to follow the pro-Western future articulated by President Zelensky. While Western assistance has been promised and only partially delivered, the Russians have accelerated their attack on Kharkiv, and some analysts think Putin is out to depopulate this city as revenge for its support of the Ukrainian government. The next few months will continue to see many deaths on both sides of this conflict, but probably no major breakthroughs. Once the United States and Western Europe follow through on their promised support, Ukraine will be able to make some significant gains and begin to reduce Russia’s occupation of 20% of Ukraine’s territory.
My research indicates that two-thirds of Ukrainians are still in favor of battling the Russian Armed Forces until all of their territory is liberated. While they face the challenge of defending their positions along a 600-mile front, Russian manpower losses continue to pile up. Leon Aron estimates that the war is costing Russia $300 million a day and consumes 40% of the country’s budget, amounts that will increase in 2024. But the financial losses are surpassed by “an estimated 50,000 killed or wounded every six months . . . an astronomical casualty rate of 37 percent . . . comparable to the British army’s attrition in World War I.”
I recently read an analysis of the war by a top Chinese scholar that contained several insights rarely found in Western analyses. Feng Yujun, a professor at Peking University, has concluded that the war in Ukraine has strained Sino-Russian relations and that “Russia is sure to lose.” He identifies four main factors that led to this conclusion. The first is the level of resistance and national unity that has been shown by the Ukrainians; second, the broad international support for Ukraine; and third, the dramatic de-industrialization following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The fourth factor identified by Yujun relates to intelligence information and its impact on decision-making. He describes Putin as “trapped in an information cocoon, thanks to his having been in power so long,” and notes that the Russian president and his National Security Council members lack access to accurate intelligence and have no mechanism for correcting errors. I am amazed that Yujun would dare say this, since President Xi is also operating in a similar cocoon (one of autocracies’ most significant weaknesses). He went on to emphasize that the war in Ukraine was a turning-point for Russia and has resulted in Putin’s regime becoming internationally isolated.
I wonder if Putin knows that the Ukrainians have increased their ability to hit Russian logistics nodes inside Russia – up to 930 miles from Ukraine. In addition, here is a brief list of some of Russia’s recent losses, which makes me wonder how Putin can arrogantly describe Russia’s strength and its confrontation with the United States and its NATO allies.
The combined gross domestic product (GDP) of NATO countries, non-NATO European Union states, and its Asian allies is more than $63 trillion; the Russian GDP is approximately $1.9 trillion. Iran and North Korea add little in terms of material support, according to the Institute for the Study of War, and China is not mobilizing on behalf of Russia.
In one 24-hour day this week, 1,740 Russian soldiers were killed or severely wounded. Russia is running out of troops from ethnic minority regions and African recruits. Putin does not want to commit ethnic Russians, because of what this would cost in terms of support for the war effort.
Russian bombers have “lost” their ammunition over Russian territory with deadly consequences for the Russian population. The lack of proper training is blamed for these “mistakes.”
Ukrainian drones keep hitting Russian oil refineries and the energy infrastructure in Russia, giving the Russian people an understanding of what the Ukrainians have dealt with for three years.
Gazprom, Russia’s massive oil and gas exporter, will experience record losses until 2030; its revenues in 2023 fell by 30%.
Russian graft in its defense establishment has severely hollowed out its military capability, as Ukraine found out in the February 2022 attack. Ukraine proudly announced that Ukraine had the superior military force, not Russia, as was previously assumed.
These failures and breakdowns are made even more problematic for Russia’s leadership now that the NATO countries have significantly increased their offers of ammunition and equipment, including an air defense system that is so badly needed in Ukraine. Some NATO countries are now giving Ukraine equipment with no constraints about their intended targets. As soon as the next two months, Ukraine will also receive F-16s, for which their pilots have been certified to fly.
One key question is whether or not the Biden Administration will explain its strategic goals in this war and what it hopes to achieve and when. We are still waiting for the president to use the word “victory” in defining our country’s goal for defeating Russia’s war of genocide and the invasion of its neighbor Ukraine.