Trying to understand the dynamics of a war, especially one that involves numerous allies on both sides, is always difficult. When asked about some of the issues involved in the Russian-Ukrainian war, my typical response is “It’s complicated!” One of the principal challenges is understanding how Vladimir Putin operates as he attempts to balance domestic concerns with the foreign relationships he must manage on Russia’s extremely long borders.
Many of us assume that the Russian government is like any large nation-state in Europe, and that the executive branch operates through its principal government agencies, while sharing power with its legislative and judicial branches. It is important to recognize that Putin has created a “personalist autocracy,” and that is not the way it works. Here’s the historical context that needs to be understood.
When Boris Yeltsin announced the nomination of Vladimir Putin as his successor in December 1999, Putin accepted the offer but made it clear that he would not participate in any presidential election rallies, political speeches, or debates with other candidates. He had no interest in “retail politics,” and his plan for rebuilding Russia was summarized in a five-thousand-word manifesto, which set forth that Putin’s goal was to restore the power of Russia’s central government, encourage national unity, and accentuate patriotism. He also said there would be no “official state ideology in Russia in any disguise.”
Putin focused on ending the chaos of the Yeltsin years, especially that of the late 1990s. He declared that “Russia needs strong state power and must have it. I am not calling for totalitarianism. History proves all dictatorships, all authoritarian forms of government, are transient. Only democratic systems are lasting.” He used a slogan to summarize what he was committed to achieve as Russia’s next president – “a dictatorship of the law.”
It did not take long for Putin and his Kremlin team to clamp down on the independent media, which is one of the first steps of any autocrat. The explosive growth of the Russian economy in the first eight years of his presidency elevated his popularity and enabled him to make decisions that significantly enhanced his personal power.
After serving two presidential terms, Putin manufactured a temporary four-year term as Russia’s Prime Minister, with Dmitry Medvedev in the presidency. At the end of this term in 2012, he returned to the presidency, which had been expanded to a six-year term by Medvedev. Putin became increasingly autocratic, using internal oppression against any opposition.
Once autocrats have brought the media under their control and have effectively limited or removed the influence of civil activists, they begin to weaken the authority of the legislature, the courts, and any bureaucratic centers of power, using their enhanced security forces to protect their interests. What often happens is that hubris begins to grow in the leader, as the constant affirmation of cronies (Putin’s refer to him as “Peter the Great” and declare “No Putin, No Russia”) convince the autocrat that he is the brightest one in the room.
This was evident in the start of the war with Ukraine in February 2022, when Putin had almost no input from his cabinet or his military commanders before deciding to initiate the attack. His understanding of Ukraine was also distorted by his advisors, who fed him what he wanted to hear about Ukraine’s weaknesses.
The failure of the Russian army on the battlefield and the recent mutiny by the Wagner Group make it clear that Putin’s goal to rebuild the power of the Russian state is one of his many failures. He operates in a post-truth political context, and his assertions rarely are grounded in reality; he said “only democratic systems are lasting,” but proceeded to build a dictatorship.
Putin weakened or destroyed most Russian state institutions and replaced them with others based on personal ties and private understandings. What scholars are now describing is how Putin over his 23 years as president turned the Russian state into a “failed state.” The traditional structures of the Russian state were replaced by privatized or semi-privatized institutions linked to the president based on personal ties and loyalty to him. One example of this is that the Russian state no longer has a monopoly on the use of violence; numerous private military companies (PMC) exist in the country, even though they are completely illegal according to the Russian constitution.
While autocrats look like the world’s most powerful strongmen, we now know more about the “Achilles’ heel” of these regimes. As an autocrat, Putin knows that leaders in his position have no safe retirement options if they lose their power. They end up in jail or exile, or dead. Putin also knows that when a Russian leader is defeated in war, there is usually a regime change. He needs to keep this war going or start another war to justify his internal oppression and failing economy.
There are many hard challenges facing Russia as a “failed state.” When he is removed from power, the post-Putin succession could become a frightening reality in the absence of functioning state institutions operating on the basis of law. Russia could quickly experience a brutal civil war among various clans, corporations, and private armies.
For NATO, what happens in Russia is of concern, but the more important priority is to defeat Russia’s imperial and genocidal war on Ukraine as soon as possible and end Putin’s reign of terror, before he launches more devastation and conflict in his desperate attempt to stay in power and protect his billions of dollars in stolen assets.