Learning about Ukraine’s Recent Historical Context – Part II
The positive image of Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” of 2004 elevated the country’s status among its European neighbors, and the new president of Ukraine made friendly relationships with the leading members of the European Union his priority. Freedom of political expression and assembly for the media and for citizens from all regions of the country was expanded, accompanied by a doubling of Ukraine’s GDP between 2004 and 2008.
Unfortunately, little was done about corruption, despite this being a major goal of the revolution, and the power of the rich elites distorted the country’s political life. In addition, a constitutional change made in 2004 resulted in political deadlock when the president lost the right to appoint the prime minister, who was now chosen by the parliament. When the top two leaders of the country offered divergent policies, neither was able to secure the votes needed to approve any reforms and the political system became dysfunctional.
This struggle was evident in many of the other post-Soviet states. After decades of totalitarian rule and top-down manipulation by former Communist Party elites who had access to the levers of power, becoming an open society was a difficult challenge that few in the West really understood. Why was it taking so long for these countries to become more democratic? The Cold War was over, democracy had defeated Communism, so what was the problem?
In November 2013, growing frustration among Ukrainians - and especially among the younger generation – exploded to the surface when hundreds of thousands of citizens once again came to Kyiv to protest. Their complaints echoed those of 2004: they wanted government reform and an end to the corruption, and they wanted to become Europeans, no longer imperial subjects managed from Moscow. Unlike Russian students, who I have described in previous essays as “Generation Nyet,” Ukrainian students played a significant part in the protests. Students numbered heavily among the “Heavenly Hundred” killed in Kyiv by government snipers in January and February 2014 and subsequently honored for their courage.
These violent attacks against students in Independence Square brought more than half a million Kyivans to the downtown area to form a space of freedom – a sacred place in the country’s history. When the government tried to outlaw the protests, bloody clashes occurred; by mid-February 2014, nine police officers and 68 protestors had lost their lives. When the Ukrainian parliament turned against the president for approving the violence against its citizens and the riot police left downtown Kyiv, the president fled, eventually escaping to Russia. A new provisional government was formed with leaders of the oppositional movement.
For the second time, ten years after the “Orange Revolution” during which his ally in Ukraine was forced from power, Putin was again unsuccessful in bringing Ukraine under his control – and he was furious. His anger was further stimulated by the refusal of several Western countries to attend the Olympics that he proudly managed in Sochi, the most expensive Olympics in history.
We now know that after a brief conversation with a small number of his closest national security council advisors on February 22, 2014 – note the date – Putin decided to bring Crimea back under Russian control. Four days later, armed men in green uniforms without any markings or identification took control of the Crimean parliament and installed a pro-Russian leader as the new prime minister. Several weeks later, Putin ordered a referendum on Crimea’s reunification with Russia, and the results were predictable – 97% approval. The Russian parliament then passed legislation legalizing the annexation of Crimea as an “act of historical justice.” In the months that followed, paramilitary units trained by Russia, and eventually joined by Russian troops, moved into the Donbas region where there was a strong pro-Russian population.
The Ukrainian government was not equipped to deter these aggressive moves by Putin in Crimea and in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics. At this point in Putin’s presidency, he had decided to reassert Russia’s power with or without the recognition of the West, and his annexation of Crimea raised his approval ratings above 85%. To most Russians, the outside world was viewed as an enemy, and a siege mentality pervaded the country.
The lack of response from the democratic powers in the West, who had simply resigned themselves to Putin’s actions, indicated to Putin that NATO and the United States were weakening. But within Ukraine, this second revolution – aptly named the “Revolution of Dignity” – was strong evidence that Russia’s actions must be countered, with or without support from the West. Significant reforms were instituted that decentralized and reformed government, and Ukrainians committed to build a well-trained and battle-ready army, no longer depending on support from other nations. These initiatives were matched by reforms of the banking industry and the energy sector. The war begun in 2014 was turning into a long-term battle that catalyzed a growing sense of unity among Ukrainians in their desire for a multilingual, multicultural state and an end to Russian intervention.
The memorial built in Kyiv honoring the “Heavenly Hundred,” who gave their lives fighting for freedom and their country’s future, was a powerful testament to the fact that Ukrainians wanted dignity and respect for their rich and diverse culture – and no autocrat in Moscow was going to take this away from them. For the citizens of Ukraine, freedom and democracy were worth dying for, and this courageous decision became an important lesson for us.